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ABSTRACT 
Distributed Cognition and Course of Action theories 
offer frameworks for micro-analysis of activity. The 
former leads to an abstract level of description of the 
propagation of information in a socio-technical system. 
The latter embeds conclusions from the Situated Action 
approach in the enaction theory to observe and analyze 
the Course of Experience. 
A compared analysis of the same moment of driving 
illustrates the discussion about similarities and 
differences between these approaches on topics such as 
the unit of analysis, the degree of stability assumed in 
the system, the contribution to design and the 
articulation of individuals, group and artifacts.   
Keywords 
Situated cognition, Course of Action, Distributed 
cognition, Driving, Design  
INTRODUCTION 
Taking the context of use into account is a crucial issue 
in such domains as mobile systems, collaborative tools 
and, more generally, in all artifacts design. Studying 
users’ activity is necessary to design tools that fulfill 
theirs needs, insure their safety and are both acceptable 
and usable for them. 
The approaches based on a computational view of 
cognition capture something of the interaction between 
a human and a computer. However they fail to take into 
account the influence of the context but also the 
cultural, situated and embodied dimensions of activity 
(Dreyfus, 1972). Several approaches of cognition have 
been developed and have interacted to challenge the 
information processing paradigm, including Situated 
Action (Suchman, 1987), Cognitive Ergonomics, 
Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 1995) or Activity 
Theory (Nardi, 1996). Comparisons of these approaches 
have been performed. Nardi (1995) offers a general 
theoretical comparison. Decortis, Noirfalise et Saudelli 
(2000) show the differences appearing in the analysis of 
a cooperative work situation. Marmaras et Nathanael 
(2005) posit these theoretical perspectives according to 
the degree of invariance that is assumed in the situation 
(stable goal structure vs opportunistic action). All these 
others show differences in issues such as unit of 
analysis, relations between objects, individual and 
group, etc. 
The Distributed Cognition approach keeps the notion of 
symbolic representation but challenges the 
computational approach in two ways: 1) manipulation 
of symbolic representations is not considered to be 
limited to the processes internal to a single individual 
but occurs across people and external tools, and 2) 
cognitive processes are studied in “the wild” and are not 
limited to controlled experimental laboratories. 
The Situated Action approach is very poorly present in 
these comparisons. Nardi underlines its historical 
benefit in correcting the role of rationalization and 
planning in cognition. However she emphasizes the 
weakness of using the situation as a unit of observation: 
1) difficulty of generalizing moment to moment analysis 
across context and 2) “behavioristic undercurrent” by 
focusing on the reaction to the situation and not 
considering consciousness, intentionality plans or prior 
knowledge. 
The Course of Action framework (Theureau, 2003) aims 
at studying how experience influences activity over 
short and long term. It includes findings from different 
theories and methodologies, Situated Action included, 
but embeds them in the enaction theory (Varela, 
Thomson et Rosch, 1991). The positive definition of the 
on-going cognitive processes brings a new light on 
Situated Action issues. 
This paper proposes a comparison between the 
Distributed Cognition and the Course of Action 
framework, which are both interested in fine grain 
analysis of activity. After a brief theoretical comparison, 
the analysis of a moment of driving in both frameworks 
is presented, from a study conducted at the HCI-DCog 
lab, UCSD (McCall, Achler, Trivedi, Haué, Fastrez, 
Forster, Hollan et Boer, 2004). Finally a discussion is 
proposed to revisit the issues of emergence, individual-
group perspective and contribution to design. 
TWO ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
The Course of Action (CoA) and Distributed Cognition 
approaches (DCog) share common perspectives and 
interests in cognition1. They both: 
• Study cognition, where 1) cognitive processes are 
grounded on the interaction between human actors 
and their environment, both social and cultural 2) 
learning creates new forms of interactions. 
• Stress the necessity of studying activity in natural 
settings (in the “wild”). 
• Have a strong interest in design and modeling (even 
if the focus is different)2. 
However they present differences, which will be 
presented according to the following themes: 
• Definition of cognition and more precisely the 
nature and locus of the cognitive processes, 
• How individual perspective, the group and the 
technical artifact are articulated, 
• Their contribution to design (presented later). 
DCog specificities 
The main hypothesis of the DCog theory is that the 
cognitive processes are constituted by the “propagation 
of representational states across representational 
media”(Hutchins, 1995). 
Propagation of representational states 
In the DCog framework, representation media may be 
any material thing, including external tools, people’s 
brain and body. The notion of representational state is 
inspired from Bateson’s definition of information, a 
“difference that makes a difference”. It is defined as a 
“configuration of the elements of a medium that can be 
interpreted as a representation of something”. The actual 
interpretation of a representational state can therefore be 
considered only in the physical, cultural and social 
context of human practices. An example provided by 
Hutchins et Klausen (1990) is how a plane cockpit 
remembers the speed of reference, according to the 
procedure of a specific maneuver. 
In this framework, studying cognitive processes during 
a given activity is done by performing a micro analysis 
of the trajectory of representational states through the 
coordination of representational media. This abstract 
level of analysis can be applied at different levels. One 
may find different cognitive properties if he focuses on 
the processes 1) internal to a single individual, 2) 
between an individual and a set of tools or 3) between a 
group of people and a set of tools. DCog emphasizes the 
danger of attributing to one’s internal processes 
                                                          
1 The activity theory, not presented here, has also very 
similar interests. 
2 DCog is more interested as computational modelling 
as a validation method and CoA bases its analysis on a 
descriptive modelling of the experienced activity.  
cognitive properties that actually belongs to the larger 
system. In other word, a “technologically advanced” 
human without internet, plane and cell phone would 
loose all his cognitive abilities. 
Studying learning is done by identifying how 
organization of representational media is propagated 
within a system. Moments of practice and socio-
technical guidance leads people to acquire and share 
internal organization that permits their coordination. In 
an even wider horizon, culture and technology are seen 
as the crystallization over time of partial solutions to 
frequently encountered problems.  
Definition of the system  
In order to perform an analysis of cognition understood 
as propagation of representational states it is necessary 
to identify what the representational media are. As all 
the human activities and artifacts are ultimately related, 
studying cognition would require including the entire 
known world in the cognitive system. Studying a given 
activity therefore requires identifying the adequate 
system. 
Reviewers consider that the DCog theory implicitly 
assumes that a socio-technical system preexists and has 
a stable goal structure (Nardi 1995) at least during a 
short time frame (Maramaras et Nathanael, 2005). 
However, DCog theory does not require assuming such 
a socio technical system. On the contrary it assumes an 
existing culture, as a long term process of crystallization 
of coordination possibilities in mind and tools.  
The studied system can be defined as the cognitive 
system enacted in a given moment of activity. It 
supposes drawing the boundaries of the system around 
all the elements that are needed to explain the outcome 
of this activity. The internal states necessary to explain 
the activity are deduced only once the propagation of 
information across the system is established from the 
observable events. 
It is therefore researchers’ responsibility to carefully 
define the system actually enacted and not to rely on the 
configurations inscribed in the material and cultural 
context, which are more easily accessible. 
Finally two consequences follow from this definition: 
• At the theoretical level, human and artifact are not 
considered as different in nature. Both are 
representational media.  
• At the epistemological level, verbalizations are not 
considered as valid data about activity but rather as 
a socially acceptable construct. 
Course of Action specificity 
The main hypothesis is that cognition is a structural 
coupling between a human and its environment, in 
which an experience is continuously enacted and 
manifests an autonomous perspective on the situation. 
Asymmetrical interaction and experience 
The CoA framework is based on the enaction theory 
(Varela, Thomson et Rosch, 1991) that defines the 
functioning of a living system as a structural coupling 
with its environment. The only stable unit is the 
biological system itself, which has his own internal 
processes. The cognitive system is defined as the 
emergent interaction between the biological processes 
and the perturbation/stimulation from the environment.  
Unlike traditional Situated Action approaches, the 
interaction is explicitly considered as asymmetrical and 
historical. The biological system adapts its structure to 
his environment: in doing so, it restitutes configurations 
of perception and action that were learned during its 
history of interaction. This creates its own autonomous 
perspective on the situation. 
For the enaction theory, the correct level to describe the 
cognitive processes is not the biological one but the 
configurations that associate the biological adaptation 
and the environmental elements. A description of the 
functioning of how the biological processes learn to 
restitute a configuration would not only be too detailed 
to be achieve about real situations but would also miss 
the part of the cognitive processes that is located in the 
interaction with the environment. 
To apply this theory, which has been developed in the 
biological field to the study of cognition, the CoA 
framework sets an additional hypothesis borrowed from 
the phenomenological tradition: human activity comes 
with an experience provided to the actor, i.e. what is 
potentially accountable for him at any moment. This 
experience is considered as the surface effect of the 
structural coupling. Getting data about the course of 
experience - that is the temporal development of this 
experience - provide an insight on what is relevant for 
him and, by deduction, what configurations of 
interaction are currently enacting the cognitive system. 
Finally studying cognitive processes comes to study, 
through data on the course of experience, what are in 
the course of action: 1) the actor’s involvement 
maintaining at any moment attention, expectations, 
goals, etc., referred thereafter as the anticipation state 
and 2) the reaction of this anticipation state to the 
perturbations resulting both in its adaptation and in 
actions, including reflexive practices. 
Studying learning comes to study how an actor can 
appropriate a new configuration of interaction. When 
integrated in its proper world (Merleau Ponty, 1945), 
the adequate perception and possibilities of action 
related to the configuration are anticipated by the 
preparation state and structure the cognitive system 
without need for any explicit effort. For instance, 
drivers appropriate their daily route. Moments and 
actions required to turn, adapt the speed or pay attention 
are given to them and barely require a thought.  
Individual and articulated Course of Action 
Stable moments of experience that are identified in an 
actor’s CoA are described by semiotic structures nested 
at different temporal levels. The hexadic sign presents 
six categories used to describe how activity emerges: 
• The anticipation state is described by: 
• E: The engagement in the situation is defined 
by the current openings, which are the themes 
of activity as opening of expectations or 
anticipations (e.g. involvement in a lane 
changing). 
• A: The anticipation structure, organizes the 
anticipated events or future courses of action, 
within the openings (e.g. absence of car in a 
lane).  
• S: The referential gathers the schemes of 
attention, action, perception or communication 
that are maintained ready to use in relation 
with the anticipations (checking blind spot). 
• Actual actions and perceptions are described by: 
• R: the representamen is what is actually 
perceived, the perturbation of the environment 
framed by the anticipation. 
• U: The unit of experience, the response 
emerging from the interaction of the perception 
(R) and the prepared schemes (S). 
• I: The “interprétant” concerns what is learned in the 
situation: creation of new schemes and extension of 
the scope or improvement of old schemes. 
In a collective activity, actors’ CoAs are articulated. 
Any actor reacts to others’ communications and actions 
according to his preparation state, more or less 
efficiently coordinated with others’. Studying the 
articulation of individual CoAs therefore allows 
identifying the cognitive processes regulating the 
collective activity.  
The CoA theory explicitly constrains researchers to look 
at the enaction of the course of experience in the current 
context. The occurrences of regularities inherited from 
the individual history, material and cultural context are 
only discriminated in a second step, while comparing 
moments of activity. 
COMPARED ANALYSIS OF A LANE CHANGING 
Presentation of the study 
The study has been done at the DCog-HCI lab, UCSD, 
in a project about Intelligent Driver Supporting System 
design funded by Nissan and involving 7 universities 
and 10 laboratories. 
The goal of the study was to conduct an ethnographic 
analysis of driving in order to 1) identify driver’s 
information needs and to 2) provide tools and method to 
enhance behavior analysis by taking driver’s meaning 
into account. A process has been performed on the topic 
of Lane Changing (LC) to generalize models and 
interaction patterns from detailed analysis, including the 
one presented below. 
Moment of driving 
This moment of driving, lasting 40 sec, takes place in 
one of the highways of the run set around the university. 
This subject is located on the far left lane when a sign 
announces her exit. Data collected for the analysis 
includes not only quantitative measures but also 
ethnographical observation of behavior and context. 
Figure 1 presents a selection of the quantitative 
measures. It firstly presents data automatically extracted 
from videos recorded during the drive. The lateral 
position within the lane is presented on the top, clearly 
showing the two lane changings. The audio activity is 
presented next with the transcription of speech. It is 
followed by the lateral position of the head, giving cues 
about perception needs, and by the foot activity. 
Secondly is presented data from the canbus, which 
records at any moment the parameters of the car: the 
pedals pressure and the steering wheel angle. 
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Figure 1: Selection of measures about the moment of driving when the LCs occur 
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 (in order to monitor 
/distance regulation, it 
is interesting to note that we have collected data about 
drivers that not only use the regulation loops classically 
described (according to car speed or to the distance with 
the car ahead) but also regulate their speed according to 
the rate they are passing cars on their right or the rate 
they are passed from their left (to have time to react if 
such a car switches to their lane). The third loop, 
maintaining traffic coordination, involves mainly the 
different monitoring areas (shield, mirrors, etc.) and 
signaling devices (light, gesture, gaze) that allow each 
driver to maintain an evaluation of the traffic around 
and to communicate with others. The last loop, 
maintaining route, could involve the direction signs, the 
landscape, the GPS network, and drivers’ individual 
resources (map, copilot, familiarity with the route).  
The state of each interaction loop at each period is 
described in figure 3, which presents only the 
observable elements participating in this situation. The 
rear mirror is not used, for instance, but the shield is an 
element of two subsystems. 
 
Periods 
Loops  /  Rep. media 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lane line 1 Maintaining 
trajectories Wheel 
position 
Staying  
in lane 
Staying  
in lane 
Staying  
in lane 
Changing 
lane 
Changing  
lane 
Stabilizing 
trajectory 
ACC Maintaining 
speed 
    
Pedals   
Stopping 
ACC 
Giving gas 
2 Maintaining 
speed / 
distance 
Shield   
Speeding up / 
car ahead 
Giving gas /  
car ahead  
Stabilizing 
speed 
Over the 
shoulder 
   Blind spot 
checking 
Blind spot 
checking 
 
Shield Monitoring 
ahead 
  Monitoring 
ahead 
3 Maintaining 
traffic 
coordination  
Side mirror  
Checking 
around 
Checking 
around 
   
Signs  Sign of exit    4 Maintaining 
route Copilot     
Correct lane 
between signs  
Figure 3: DCOG collaboration between representational media within and across sub system during the LC 
An analysis of a LC event, as the physical crossing of 
lane lines would focus on the subsystem “1 Maintaining 
trajectory” during the step 4 and 5.  
During these steps, the trajectory of the car crosses a 
line. However the steering wheel is not used in the same 
way as the second LC is made in the continuation of the 
first one. The subsystems 2 and 3 are also mobilized in 
order to support this change in subsystem 1: each time, 
the gas pedal is pushed when the crossing of the lane is 
initiated and a check of the blind spot is done over the 
shoulder. This check has been observed for most of the 
LCs with this driver and for an important amount of 
LCs across drivers. In order to explain the step 4 and 5 
it is also necessary to extend the domain of analysis to 
include the step 2-3 and 6. During the step 6 the 
trajectory perturbed during the step 4 and 5 is stabilized. 
Checks on the traffic are also done during the step 2 and 
3. It is necessary to infer that they provide the driver 
with the knowledge that the spot to do her LC is safe in 
order to explain that only a blind spot checking is 
performed during step 4 and 5. 
But even if it is extended to subsystem 1 to 3 during the 
period 2 to 6, this analysis does not explain what 
triggers the first LC and its continuation in the second 
one. When enlarging the scope of the analysis, it 
appears that the subsystems 1 to 3 are coordinating in 
subordination to the subsystem “4 Maintaining the 
route”. From the uneventful driving occurring in period 
1, the perturbation actually starts with the sign 
announcing the exit, which perception is attested by a 
comment whispered by the driver. This sign 
immediately triggers events in other subsystems: ACC 
is turned off to switch to manual control and the right 
side mirror is added to the shield to provide the driver 
with a perception of the traffic around (behind on the 
right). If the subsystem 4 triggers the LC sequence it 
also indicates its ending, as shown in period 5. Because 
signs indicate two different exits (cf. sky view in figure 
2), the driver asks a confirmation to the copilot to 
discriminate the good one. Once in the correct lane, the 
LCs have no more reasons to be executed. 
The levels of grey restitute the configuration of higher 
level that organized the cooperation between the 
subsystems. The light grey is about the apparition of a 
configuration requiring a change of lane in the system, 
in this case triggered by the subsystem 4 (planned route 
and announced exit). The medium grey is about 
assuring the spot (space, speed and traffic control) and 
the dark grey is about the physical crossing of the lanes. 
This kind of analysis has been used to identify such 
configurations of interaction in the system and to end up 
with a state model of LC (not published yet). 
Course of action analysis 
The analysis of driver’s Course of Action was done for 
the same moment of driving. In order to interpret the 
dynamic of driver’s experience inferences were checked 
against the behavioral and contextual data but also 
information from driver’s comments during other 
moments of drive or during the interviews.  
Sign 1 Following  
the road 
2 Getting ready to 
cross road 
3 Preparing LC 4 LC to go to the 
right 
5 LC to go to the 
right 
5.2 Checking 
right lane 
6 Arriving to 
exit 
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Exit schemes) 
Exit/LC Schemes Exit scheme 
LC: Spot  
Exit scheme 
LC: Blind spot 
Exit scheme 
LC: Blind spot 
Exit scheme  
go lane empty 
igns 
Exit sign 
Light traffic 
Just one car ahead Car ahead 
Lane lines 
Lane lines Signs for 2 lanes 
Copilot’s answer 
E
ollow lane 
xit not yet 
Whisper “15” 
Need to cross road 
Hand up 
Check behind 
Hand up 
Speed up / car 
Ready for LC 
Check behind 
Change trajectory 
Check behind 
Maintain 
trajectory 
Uncertainty 
Ask for lane  
Lane ok 
Restore trajectory 
H
A
      
Figure 4: Description of driver’s CoA during the LC.  
Sign categories are described in the previous section. 
ents of experience follow almost exactly the 
ntified in DCog analysis. However, informing 
gories of the sign for each moment of 
e helps inferring what is going on for the 
 becomes possible to specify for instance the 
es between LCs in step 4 and in step 5 or the 
iver’s familiarity and preparation. 
 4, the description of the preparation state 
ows how driver’s adaptation to the situation 
his actions. The first line presents a summary 
course of experience (the levels of grey 
d to the high level configurations, described 
y, in which the drivers is involved). It shows 
engagement in the situation creates and closes 
. Nested openings are created while the 
n focuses toward the LC. The depth of driver’s 
ent coming with this focus is shown by a body 
ations: 1) the general quantity of activity 
 head and hand movements, 2) the position of 
hand taking a higher position in anticipation of 
l move and 3) the body posture that gets 
 up toward the scene.  
uring the first sign, the driver is engaged in 
n an empty lane (1.E) supposing no more 
on than staying in the lane (1.A) and trajectory 
n scheme (1.S). But data from the interview 
 the driver is a little bit familiar with this 
f the route. From this fact and the quick but 
eaction of the exit sign, occurring later in sign 
can assume that during sign 1 she is also 
 the exit to come, without knowing exactly 
his background engagement (1.E) and the 
ding anticipation (1.A) has two consequences: 
ver perceives as significant the direction signs 
y occur3 and can conclude that the exit is not 
                                           
                                                          
 possible to identify what a driver is looking at 
 observable head moves without an eye 
, which is hard to use in naturalistic situations. 
yet (1.U); 2) the set  of schemes necessary to g
is maintained active4.  
Sign 2. The perception of the expected exit s
which is manifested by the whisper “15” 
provokes an adjustment of the preparation s
theme of interest about the exit, which w
background, becomes preeminent (2.E), whic
both the anticipation (2.A) and the interpreta
the need of crossing the road (2.U). The exi
are reactivated too, including LC ones (S), w
to the hand moving up in anticipation to the
change (2.U). The first look on the right, b
acceleration and before the more systema
monitoring occurring in sign 3, seems 
assessment of the traffic to select the adequate
The very light traffic in this situation only 
very simple strategy. 
Sign 3. During the third sign the drive
prepares the LC. She increases her speed, wh
the position of the car ahead into account. Sev
are done to check if any car is coming fro
which not the case is. The preparation state d
period, prior to the actual LC, is focused on as
spot needed (3.S) to perform the anticipated
until the LC is considered ready (3.U). Not
theme of interest and anticipation in this sign
spot) are not completely new but include
previous one (getting the exit).   
Sign 4 and 5. During the sign 4 and 5, the dri
her trajectory to physically cross the lane line
second checking over the shoulder, observed 
this driver’s LC, is one of the LC scheme
related to the anticipation of having a car com
blind spot (4&5.A).  
4 Getting such an exit requires knowing that it
on the right of the road, the typical distance
sign, the difficulty according to the traffic, et
5 Please note that the different categories of th
not sequential steps. They describe the d
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Sign 5.2. The sign 5.2 shows a wavering in the driver’s 
anticipation state, leading to the question to the copilot 
(5.2.U). The perception of different exit lanes (5.2.R) 
explains this trouble. The current structuring of the 
engagement was entering a lane, while checking the 
traffic around, in order to get the exit on the right side of 
the road (built from 2.E to 5.2.E). In this context, the 
discrimination of the correct lane (5.2.U) could not be 
achieved with too announced exits. Known exit patterns 
actually allow that the far right lane is only for the first 
exit or that it stays a lane of the road (5.2.S). The 
anticipation of being brought into the wrong exit (5.2.A) 
leads to the question about the adequacy of the current 
lane (5.2.U). The copilot’s confirmation fixes the 
uncertainty and provokes the restoration of the 
trajectory. 
In the last sign, the driver is arrived in the adequate 
lane. Her expectation related to getting the exit, crossing 
the road, doing one more LC can close and the 
anticipation state can get back to the more relaxed 
position of driving in her the new lane.  
Nothing precise from the data could be said about 
formation of new scheme or habits (I). Being on this 
route later could therefore benefit from this moment and 
the driver could recognize landscape of road 
configuration related to this exit. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Stable or emergent definition of the situation 
The DCog and CoA analyses show comparable patterns 
occurring during this moment of driving. The global 
configurations of the interaction loops (fortunately) 
correspond with the structuring of driver’s experience. 
However, the two frameworks stress different 
theoretical points of view on the interaction. According 
to the degree of assumption of persistent constraints in 
the situation, they can be positioned in different 
locations in the A-B continuum (Marmaras et 
Nathanael, 2005).  
The interest of each perspective depends on the given 
activity domain. Driving is a good example because it is 
neither a very structured domain, such as plane driving, 
nor a very loose one such as informal work meetings.  
On the one hand, micro analyses in the DCog 
framework stress out the persistence of structure and 
relation between elements of the system (pole A). Even 
if the representational media can be defined according 
to the activity in a specific situation, it is tempting and 
interesting to rely on the typical interactions supported 
by cultural and material settings. For instance, the prior 
identification of interaction loops makes it possible to 
create very concise descriptions that restitute the 
coordination between subsystems. 
Road infrastructures and social conventions definitively 
bring stable constraints on driving. The lane lines and 
the driving rules have shared symbolic meaning. Their 
conventions restrain the minimal information needed. 
Staying in a lane normally protects from car not only 
from behind but also from both sides. Entering a new 
lane requires more information, in order to secure the 
spot necessary for safely changing trajectory: from 
behind, from one side and from ahead. Finally the spot 
formation, for instance, is not only the result of the 
driver’s activity. Other drivers can detect or predict the 
LC project and change their own driving to respect it.  
On the other hand, CoA framework requires focusing on 
the emergent process of interaction without relying on 
existing situation invariants (pole B). The distinction 
between engagement (E), anticipation (A) and schemes 
ready to use (S) offers a finer and more flexible 
description than the classical notion of goal. Historically 
constructed socio-technical constraints are however not 
ignored, as in classical situated action approach. They 
are just subordinated to their integration in actor’s 
engagement. Moreover the situation is not isolated but 
integrated in the history of interaction. The structuring 
of actor’s engagement captures the just past history. 
Configurations learned during actor’s history provide 
him with anticipations and schemes, according to his 
engagement.  
Each driver has a different history, different habits and 
styles. The familiarity with the route played an 
important role in our LC, as well as the light traffic, the 
presence of the copilot, etc. Each context is different 
and can enact an important number of intra and 
interpersonal variations in driving that could lead, for 
instance, to multiple sources of failure in LC. 
A physical object is not in or out of a given system. It 
could be active in the system, ready to be activated, 
available but not active, present but not appropriated, 
etc. Individual learning, cultural learning and technical 
evolution change the relations between people and 
objects at different time scale. Different perspectives 
about stability or emergence of situation constraints 
seem necessary to cover these multiple dimensions. 
System behavior VS individual experience 
Both frameworks describe the processes going on 
during the human(s)-environment interaction at an 
abstract level.  
The CoA framework uses data from actor’s experience, 
which is assumed to be the surface effect of his 
structural coupling with his environment, to get a 
relevant summary of the asymmetrical interaction.  
The DCog framework does not consider experience but 
a symmetrical interaction between human and tools, 
defined as a manipulation of representation. It describes 
the observable part of the interaction in order to identify 
their coordination and internal states. 
Relying on human experience to get data brings many 
issues that are avoided when using only observable 
behavior:  
• Testimonies about experience are socially and 
historically constructed. The CoA framework had 
to develop methods to collect data as well as 
methodological and epistemological criteria 
evaluating its validity. 
• The collected data is rarely rich enough to inform 
all the categories of the hexadic sign and must be 
completed by deduction from comparison with 
prior or post moments of action. 
• Getting a satisfying description of experience by 
filling the sign categories requires an important 
work. The result should be concise enough and 
should explain the different observed phenomena. 
• The influence of others, environment and artifacts 
is disseminated in the categories of the different 
signs. Identifying recurrent configurations requires 
comparing the temporal structures of different 
CoAs. 
Facing the issues about human experience allow a 
deeper understanding of activity, integrating for 
instance its opportunistic or emotional aspects. 
Moreover, the CoA framework takes the autonomous 
perspective of actors into account, while the DCog offer 
a description that is more concise but only at the system 
level. Understanding some situations may indeed 
require unravelling the individual courses of experience. 
According to the situation, a DCog analysis could be 
enough to capture the configurations that explain 
activity. A CoA analysis would require more data and 
efforts but could dig up more elements potentially 
important. 
Contribution to design 
Because of its cybernetic roots, the DCog framework 
selects the abstract level of description where both the 
activity analyst and the designer could gather. The 
interaction loops categories provide configurations that 
can be used to integrate automation tools and driver’s 
information need. Scenarios and alternatives could be 
elicited to provide a common ground for design. What if 
an Intelligent Driving Support System was inserted in 
the “vigilance on traffic” loop in order to help finding 
the LC spot or checking the blind spot? 
However this high level of abstraction and the 
validation by creating computational models keep away 
all the contextual elements of the situation. Their 
consideration is nevertheless important to identify the 
possibilities and conditions of improvement of the 
interaction.  
The CoA framework explicitly adopts the perspective of 
transforming the situation to improve users’ experience. 
Introducing the hypothesis of appropriation (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945) in a cognitive engineering approach (Haué 
2004) presents many interests. It leads not only to 
search where and how a tool could be introduced to help 
a driver while respecting its preparation state but also to 
anticipate and support the appropriation process itself. 
The hexadic categories produce a litteralisation of users’ 
experience that articulate the local emergence (within 
the sign) and its temporal integration (trough 
engagement structure). This description can be 
manipulated to explore design alternatives. Supporting 
spot finding of spot checking would decrease driver’s 
involvement. But a system, either within the car or by 
direction signs, which would elicit the correct exit lane 
during the moment between sign 2 and 5.2 would also 
have avoided the trouble experienced by the driver. 
The CoA framework can inform design choices with 
material about users’ experience. The cost is that the 
application is not straight forward. It requires a 
generalization to go from a particular situation to 
generic needs and an extraction/formalization to get 
technical specifications.  
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